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Abstract
The final responsibility to verify whether a newly purchased
hardware security token (HST) is authentic and unmodified
lies with the end user. However, recently reported attacks
on such tokens suggest that users cannot take the security
guarantees of their HSTs for granted, even despite widely
deployed authenticity checks. We present the first comprehen-
sive market review evaluating the effectiveness and usability
of authenticity checks for the most commonly used HSTs.
Furthermore, we conducted a survey (n = 194) to examine
users’ perceptions and usage of these checks.
We found that due to a lack of transparency and informa-
tion, users often do not carry out—or even are not aware
of—essential checks but rely on less meaningful methods.
Moreover, our results confirm that currently deployed authen-
ticity checks suffer from improperly perceived effectiveness
and cannot mitigate all variants of distribution attacks. Further-
more, some authenticity concepts of different manufacturers
contradict each other. In order to address these challenges, we
suggest (i) a combination of conventional and novel authen-
ticity checks, and (ii) a user-centered, transparent design.
1 Introduction
Due to an abundance of reported malware and CPU vulner-
abilities [32, 46, 76, 85, 117], the establishment of trust has
in recent years shifted from general-purpose computers to
specialized single-application devices, i.e., hardware security
tokens (HSTs). HSTs (e.g., Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)
tokens or cryptocurrency hardware wallets) promise to keep
the stored secrets secure, even if attackers control the client
computer. Consequently, these tokens have experienced an
enormous market growth during the last decade [72, 73]; all
major browsers and many large service providers now support
2FA tokens [110]. Similarily, in the cryptocurrency ecosys-
tem hardware wallets are considered the most secure way to
manage keys and sign transactions.
However, known attacks using modified, replaced, or coun-
terfeit tokens [60, 75, 86, 95, 109] raise the questions whether
this shift of trust is justified and how users may verify the
authenticity of their HSTs. In the context of this paper, au-
thenticity checks are defined as (i) conventional attestation1
methods, and (ii) haptic and visual inspection of the packag-
ing, casings and electronics.
Despite extensive research focusing on authenticity checks
for computing devices [6, 27, 63, 70, 80, 99], little attention
has been paid to whether and how these checks can be ap-
plied to HSTs. For HSTs, no categorization of authenticity
checks concerning their effectiveness, efficiency, or usability
exists. As a result, HST manufacturers2 have no directives
or best practices available for designing and implementing
defenses. Although end users play a central role in judging
a token’s authenticity, no human-centered research has so
far been pursued in this area. It remains therefore unclear
how users can make sure that a token is genuine and/or has
not been manipulated. In particular, the following research
questions arise:
(RQ1) How effective are currently deployed authenticity
checks of HSTs in defending against possible attacks?
(RQ2) How do users perceive and use the provided authen-
ticity checks?
(RQ3) Which (combination of) authenticity checks can max-
imize security and usability?
To answer these questions, we contribute:
• A market review of authenticity checks deployed in
HSTs, yielding an evaluation framework for comparing
their effectiveness and usability.
• A quantitative survey (n = 194) to understand users’ per-
ception, awareness and usage of the investigated authen-
ticity checks as well as related trust decisions.
• Actionable recommendations pointing out directions for
the best (combination of) authenticity checks.
In this paper, we assessed (i) cryptocurrency hardware wal-
lets, as they are high-value targets, and (ii) Universal Second
1Attestation proves that no unwarranted modifications to the software or
hardware took place [13].
2Companies that (mostly) perform the final assembly as well as the de-









Figure 1: Simplified U2F/HW-Wallet Authentication Models
Factor (U2F) tokens which are widely used for 2FA. We focus
on attacks which take place during the distribution process,
consequently defining them as distribution attacks. Many of
these attacks can be carried out with no technical expertise,
in reasonable time, and with low financial cost.
2 Hardware Security Tokens (HSTs)
The main purpose of HSTs is to securely store cryptographic
keys. Depending on the application context, the tokens can
carry out different operations such as proving a user’s identity
or signing a cryptocurrency transaction.
2.1 Hardware Wallets
Hardware wallets are used to store the user’s private key in
tamper-resistant storage and to sign transactions. For this
purpose they communicate with a PC via USB (or alterna-
tively, NFC or Bluetooth) as shown in Figure 1. A dedicated
client software constructs transactions and sends them to the
hardware device for signing. The device signs after explicit
and successful user approval (e.g., PIN or hash comparison).
When used for the first time, the device generates a seed for
deterministic private keys which never leaves the wallet [33].
Hardware wallets fully control the secrets for signing. They
have access to the complete transactions including sender and
receiver address, an optional change address, and the payment
amount. The increased usage of hardware wallets makes them
a valuable attack target.
2.2 U2F Tokens
Currently, the most popular U2F tokens are the YubiKeys (cf.
the corresponding media and industry attention [37, 50] and
Google trend analysis [34]). YubiKeys provide multi-factor
and password-less authentication for logins. They currently
support, amongst others, the following protocols: (i) Univer-
sal 2nd Factor (U2F/FIDO2), (ii) one-time password (OTP),
(iii) Smart card, and (iv) PGP. In this paper, we focus on
YubiKey’s U2F functionality.
The tokens are shipped with a pre-configured public/private
identity and an AES key which serves as the master secret
for deriving subsequent authentication keys. Users may also
generate their own keys. The initialized YubiKey communi-
cates with the computer via USB [26]—including mimicking
a keyboard [114]—or NFC.
In U2F mode, the user sends the password to the server
which replies with a challenge (see Figure 1); the user’s pres-
ence is verified by touching the YubiKey sensor. Then the
YubiKey utilizes a private key generated per-service to calcu-
late a response to the server’s challenge, i.e., a signature. The
browser never learns the private key and the YubiKey never
sees the user’s password, hence there is no single point of
trust. An application ID derived from the URI is included in
the signature to prevent phishing attacks.
3 Related Work
The usability challenges of HSTs and 2FA schemes have
been extensively studied. Bonneau et al. [10] showed that
most password-less web authentication methods, including
hardware tokens, outperform passwords regarding security
but are weaker concerning usability. Payne et al. [81] ex-
plored user perceptions of the Pico authentication token. They
found that tokens increase the user’s responsibility to mitigate
security risks, which is usually perceived as inconvenient.
More recently, Acemyan et al. [2] found severe usabil-
ity issues in Google 2FA features. Studies by Reynolds et
al. [87, 88] revealed usability issues in the set-up and usage
of U2F tokens in enterprise and non-enterprise settings. Das
et al. [18] conducted a study with YubiKey users, reporting
usability and trust issues as well as misconceptions about the
token’s benefits. In two other user studies, Ciolino et al. [14]
confirmed uncertainties about the security benefits of 2FA to-
kens and identified usability issues of online services secured
with 2FA. Human-centered research in the domain of hard-
ware wallets mainly focused on the fact that humans usually
fail to manually compare long hashes [20, 42, 104], which is
required by most devices. So far, user perceptions of HST au-
thenticity and related decisions regarding trust—as presented
in this paper—have not been examined.
In order to prevent and detect supply-chain tampering
of software and hardware [7, 17], various attestation ap-
proaches have been suggested. Software attestation [6, 63,
99, 101] aims at validating the authenticity of code by ver-
ifying software modules (e.g., calculating a hash or MAC).
Hardware attestation aims to ensure the authenticity of hard-
ware components. Approaches range from (i) dedicated hard-
ware designs (e.g., tamper-proof environments for isolation
of security-critical functionality [66], single-piece or open-
able enclosures [36], tamper-evident seals [48]) to (ii) sensors
that detect suspicious behavior [31, 39, 62] to (iii) hardware
metering [52, 53] (e.g., using PUFs [38, 44, 91] or IC finger-
printing [3]).
However, each of these approaches poses different chal-
lenges [5]. Hence, solutions must be found that combine sev-
eral methods and are tailored to each use case and threat
model. We discuss which of these approaches are currently
implemented by popular HSTs and evaluate how effective they
are against real-world attack vectors (see Section 4.1). Dauter-
man et al. [19] introduced a two-party key and signature gen-
eration protocol as a (partial) solution to defend against faulty
or backdoored tokens. We discuss their scheme in Section 7.4.
While previous research mainly focused on a theoretic evalua-
tion of individual attestation methods, our work assesses these
methods’ usability for HSTs operated by average end users.
4 Threat Model
The attackers’ aim is to exfiltrate or pre-load secrets stored
on the HST (i.e., keys or cryptographic seeds), interrupt its
availability, or ask for ransom [12]. Attackers can replace
or modify HSTs anywhere and anytime between the token
leaving the manufacturer and arriving at the end user. This
includes building fraudulent HSTs and selling them directly
to end users, inserting them into the re-seller hierarchy, or
intercepting and replacing shipments during delivery. An at-
tacker might also buy a genuine token and return a tampered
one to the vendor who usually does not check the returned de-
vices before redistribution [43]. We define this set of attacks
as distribution attacks.
Attacks performed after the initialization of a hardware
device such as Man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks are
out of this work’s scope. We assume token manufacturers
and designers to be trustworthy, meaning that they are not
altering hardware or firmware. Still, fraudulent manufacturers
or parties that (re-)sell counterfeit tokens do exist. We include
nation-state attackers if they modify or replace HSTs on their
route from the manufacturer to the end user. Finally, for au-
thenticity checks involving the client software we assume that
this software is not compromised.
Generally, attacks can be aimed at one or more specific
targets (targeted attacks) or at multiple unspecific targets
(large-scale attacks). Targeted attacks concern U2F token
users (e.g., campaign teams, activists, journalists, IT admin-
istrators) and individual hardware wallet users holding high
amounts of cryptocurrencies. In contrast, large-scale attacks
mainly affect hardware wallets due to the expected monetary
gain. Even though reported attacks on HSTs are still rare,
their relevance for HST users is justified given the financial
and/or reputational losses. Also, talks and papers on the con-
struction of counterfeit tokens [60, 75] emphasize that HST
authenticity should be addressed before a larger number of
attacks can take place.
4.1 Attack Vectors
We conducted an extensive review of scientific literature, se-
curity conferences, and blog articles to understand the threat
landscape of HSTs. We then extracted attack vectors which
are categorized in software, hardware, and secret extraction.
We define attack vectors as ways or means by which attack-
ers can carry out attacks. Examples of attack scenarios are
described in Section 4.2. A visual mapping of attack vectors
and scenarios can be found in Table 1.
Although the attack vectors are the same for hardware wal-
lets and YubiKeys, the actual attack scenarios vary, since Yu-
biKeys and other U2F tokens—unlike hardware wallets—do
not present a single point of trust when used for 2FA. Here, the
key material alone is useless since the token never learns the
user’s password. However, if the token is used for single-factor
authentication, a counterfeit token that manages to exfiltrate
or pre-load secrets can achieve authentication. Consequently,
using a U2F token without a supplementary factor increases
the probability of severe attacks being successful.
4.1.1 Software
Firmware modifications can be conducted by reverse-
engineering code, changing open-source software, or taking
advantage of firmware vulnerabilities. Alternatively, attack-
ers might exploit security risks of the USB interface (USB
exploits) [106] or pre-initialize tokens. Programmers for ex-
ample can conduct such attacks without any special additional
knowledge [86, 98, 108, 109].
4.1.2 Hardware
Attackers can add and wire-up additional components to the
token—so-called hardware implants such as a GSM mod-
ule or Bluetooth transceiver. This aims at leaking secrets or
remotely controlling the tokens. Alternatively, Integrated Cir-
cuit (IC) modification is possible to introduce vulnerabilities
or backdoors [8].
Lastly, attackers can build token replicas, which is feasible
for hardware wallets and YubiKeys [60, 75]. Instructions on
how to create HST replicas are publicly available and can
be implemented without any expert knowledge. If successful,
attackers gain full access to the design of the hardware and
firmware and may modify them to their own advantage.
4.1.3 Secret Extraction
Hardware and software attacks use various approaches to ex-
tract secrets from a token, e.g., keys or cryptographic seeds.
Most commonly, information can be derived from fault injec-
tions, timing side-channels (including transient execution
attacks (see Section 5.2.3), IC microprobing, or bus snoop-
ing [8]. Some of these attacks require expensive equipment
and in-depth knowledge. However, respective instructions are
publicly available and prices for the required equipment are
falling, thus facilitating secret extraction [43].
4.2 Attack Scenarios
Run-time seed or key exfiltration (in-band): The attacker
replaces the HST and/or modifies its firmware so that it leaks
secrets through in-protocol covert channels3 via the signa-
ture [23] or other parts of the transaction [11].
Run-time seed or key exfiltration (out-of-band): The
attacker modifies or replaces the HST’s software or hardware
so that it leaks secrets through covert channels outside the
3Covert channels [116] intentionally hide the communication between
two parties, whereas side channels unintentionally leak internal state.
protocol (e.g., using Bluetooth [60], Wi-Fi, GSM [75], or
USB exploits.
Delivery-time seed or key extraction: Through side chan-
nels, bus snooping, IC microprobing, or fault injection, the
attacker extracts pre-configured keys or seeds that allow key
determination [60, 78, 82]. This attack is relevant for Yu-
biKeys which are shipped with manufacturer-chosen seeds—
and as long as users do not programm their own secrets later
on—but is infeasible for hardware wallets since customers
(should) initialize the tokens themselves.
Seed or key fixation: Using hardware implants, token repli-
cation, or firmware modification, the attacker pre-loads a key
to the token, makes the key computation deterministic, or
pre-initializes a hardware wallet and inserts a fake recovery
sheet [98].
Predictable RNG modification: The attacker makes the
Random Number Generator predictable [68] by using hard-
ware implants, replicated HSTs, or IC/firmware modifications.
Alternatively, the attacker exploits unintentionally weak ran-
domness [113].
USB pivoting: The attacker uses the USB interface to infect
the computer with malware [106], trigger buffer overflows
in the client software, or emulate a keyboard similar to a
USB Rubber Ducky [71]. This can be used for attacks on
YubiKeys that require leaking information such as usernames
or passwords in addition to the key or seed.




G# complicates attack/decreases usefulness








































































































. Tamper-evident G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G#





e Single-piece cast  G# G# # # # # G# G# #
Openable device G# G# # # # # # # # #
Secure element (co-processor) #   # # #  G#   





e Local firmware attestation # # #  # # # # # #
Remote firmware attestation # G# #  # # # # # #
Key attestation #  # G# # # # # # #
















e Runtime seed or key exfilt. (in-band) – 4 – 4 – – – – – –
Runtime seed or key exfilt. (out-of-band) 4 4 4 4 4 – – – – –
Delivery-time seed or key extraction – – – – – – 4 4 4 4
Seed or key fixation 4 4 – 4 – 4 – – – –
Predictable RNG modification 4 4 4 4 – – – – – –
O
th
er USB pivoting 4 4 4 – 4 – – – – –
Ransom attack 4 4 – 4 – – – – – –
1 For U2F tokens, the attacker needs a second source for retrieving username/password.
Ransom attack: Using hardware implants, token replica-
tion, or firmware modification, the attacker modifies the token
which then stops operating after some time, demanding a ran-
som to resume operation or release the key material. This
attack is especially efficient with hardware wallets which are
in control of the secret key material and the derivation of the
used addresses. Consequently, a fraudulent hardware wallet
can prevent the user from obtaining a trustworthy backup of
the secret material by displaying a wrong recovery seed. Al-
ternatively, it can generate addresses which cannot be derived
from a correct backup [12]. This attack is limitedly feasible
for YubiKeys, as backup keys are usually generated.
5 Market Review of Authenticity Checks
To answer RQ1, we assessed four different models of the U2F
YubiKey and the five most recent hardware wallets4 from the
three most popular vendors at the time of writing [73].
We chose YubiKeys as representatives of FIDO/U2F-
tokens based on previous research [18, 88] and Yubico’s
role as the currently leading U2F-manufacturer (see Sec-
tion 2.2). To ensure that YubiKeys are indeed representative
of attestation and packaging methods used in the U2F to-
ken industry, we surveyed other U2F-certified tokens (e.g.,
Google Titan [35], Thetis BLE/FIDO U2F [105], Feitian
ePass FIDO [30]) before the market review. We found that Yu-
biKeys’ methods are the most comprehensive in the industry
(see Appendix, Table 6).
We examined nine widely used tokens and are therefore
confident that our results are representative (although not
exhaustive) of authenticity checks deployed in today’s HSTs.
5.1 Methodology
In order to assess which authenticity checks were deployed
and if they were usable, we performed a set of cognitive
walkthroughs [83]. A cognitive walkthrough is a technique
for expert usability inspection of a system and commonly
applied in user-centered security research [28]. Thereby, an
expert steps through a set of actions while considering the
interface behavior and its effect on the user. For this study,
two usable security researchers walked through the actions a
user has to perform when receiving an HST and initializing it,
including the examination of the packaging. For each of these
actions we asked: Does the user understand what they are
supposed to do? Does the user know how to do it? After the
action is done, does the user know whether it was successful?
We used the findings of the cognitive walkthroughs to design
our quantitative survey (see Section 6).
Additionally, we consulted the manufacturers’ documen-
tation to obtain a complete list of the deployed authenticity
checks. We then connected these findings with the data of
our cognitive walkthroughs and established three categories
for authenticity checks (Inter-rater reliability: Krippendorff’s
4Some hardware wallets offer U2F functionality as an add-on. However,
we focused only on their core funcionality.
α=.91): (i) packaging, (ii) hardware, and (iii) software. In
order to systematically evaluate each authenticity check, we
mapped them to attack vectors (see Section 4.1), thus building
an evaluation framework for comparing the effectiveness of
current and future authenticity checks (see Table 1).
5.2 Results
In this section we present a comprehensive evaluation of the
usability and effectiveness of currently deployed authenticity
checks. Table 2 shows the investigated devices and their au-
thenticity checks. Table 1 illustrates our evaluation framework
by mapping deployed authenticity checks to attack vectors.
The effectiveness assessment is based on the currently de-
ployed best-case implementation of every method, as found
in the market review. We also discuss deviations from the best
case scenario, since flawed or inadequate implementations
make every method ineffective.
5.2.1 Packaging
Trezor One and one of the tested YubiKeys were shipped in a
tamper-evident package, meaning that it shows if a package
has been opened. The hardware wallets arrived in cardboard
boxes or shrink-wrap plastic. YubiKey recently switched to
hard shells (i.e., tamper-evident blister packaging), but older
models were delivered in plastic sleeves. A lot of manufactur-
ers additionally provide pictures of the original packaging on
their websites and encourage customers to report and return
damaged shipments. Six of the assessed devices came with
holographic stickers.
Effectiveness: Tamper-evident packages render an attack
slightly more difficult: an attacker would have to re-package
a modified device in a genuine-looking way. Still, all types
of packaging can be reproduced; paper boxes and standard
plastic sleeves are easy and cheap, whereas reconstructing
tamper-evident plastic wraps is more expensive, since special-
purpose machines are needed. Hence, the latter only pays off if
attacks are carried out on a large scale. Holographic stickers
only provide a low level of protection against distribution
attacks. They can be removed with a common blow dryer [75],
and new ones are easy to come by [45].
Usability: Some packages are destroyed when opened,
making any tampering clearly visible. Also, there are self-
destroying holographic stickers which cannot be easily re-
placed. However, other types of packaging—e.g., simple pa-
per boxes—do not show obvious signs after they have been
opened. Only a few manufacturers provide information on
what the original package and holographic sticker(s) should
look like. Therefore, users often do not have any possiblity to
verify if the packaging is the original one.
5.2.2 Hardware (Enclosure)
Manufacturers take two contrary approaches in order to se-
cure the token body. One way is to use a single-piece cast.
Yubico chose this method and encourages users to check the
integrity of tokens through visual inspection. The other way is
Table 2: Device and Feature Overview
 fulfilled/implemented/included
H# sometimes # not fullfilled























































. Tamper-evident # #  # #  H#1 H#1 H#1






Single-piece cast –2 –2 # # #     
Openable device   # # # –2 –2 –2 –2
Secure CPU # # # # #  # # #






Local firmware attestation      ? ? ? ?
Remote firmware attestation   # # # # # # #
Key attestation   # # #    #
Manual firmware load # #   # # # # #
1 Packaging changed multiple times in recent years. 2 Mutually exclusive.
a token which can easily be opened to compare the inside
to reference pictures on the manufacturer’s website. The
latter was the case for two of the assessed hardware wallets.
Effectiveness: Some single-piece cast devices are easy to
break by using household chemicals [40]. Therefore, the Yu-
biKey 5 series is made with a more chemical-resistant thermo-
plastic. Since the electronics are tightly molded, it is infeasible
for an attacker to add hardware components. Creating token
replicas or modifying ICs of a single-piece cast token requires
a very elaborate process, since an original-looking cast has
to be built from scratch. At the same time, these attacks have
the advantage that the built-in hardware does not need to look
genuine, only the case does (assuming that end users usually
do not x-ray their devices). Lastly, it is feasible—although
very elaborate—to conduct bus snooping or IC microprobing
by drilling small, resealable holes into the case.
On the one hand, openable tokens and visual inspectability
enable users to discover implants and make token replica
attacks more difficult. On the other hand, openable tokens
give attackers easy access as well. It can be assumed that
well-made, subtle hardware implants would not be noticeable
to users. IC modifications are also possible, since chips come
in standardized packages which are easily re-constructed.
Usability: Visually comparing the interior of the device
with manufacturer-provided pictures is a cumbersome and
error-prone method. Users might damage the case when open-
ing it, which reduces the feasibility and usability of this ap-
proach. Tamper-resistant casts do not exhibit these usability
issues.
5.2.3 Hardware (Circuit)
Electronic signals on the printed circuit board (PCB) or within
an IC are subject to interception and manipulation. Shielding
of critical data and the respective circuitry can be accom-
plished through a secure CPU, or by integrating an external
co-processor (secure element) on the PCB. The keys reside
inside the CPU or element and never leave it. Many software-
based authenticity checks only provide strong protection
when implemented in such hardened CPU design and architec-
ture (e.g., firmware or key attestation). In our wallet sample,
only Ledger facilitates a secure element [59]. Trezor in fact
argues against secure elements, as they are closed source soft-
ware, and postulates that if “secure elements [are] widely used,
it will increasingly attract the attention of hackers” [94].
Effectiveness: Many secure CPUs and secure elements are
designed with the hardware attacker in mind and provide
the respective prevention measures. They usually employ
side-channel-resistant design and tamper-detection circuits
within the IC. However, even if secure CPUs (including en-
claves) are used, transient execution attacks [51, 64, 107] can
extract secrets via i.a. cache-timing side-channels once the
attacker achieves code execution. Such features are still sel-
dom found in low-end microcontrollers as used in wallets and
authentication tokens. All wallets in our device overview use
ARM Cortex M0-M4 architectures which neither employ data
caches nor transient execution. External secure elements are
vulnerable to hardware implants [93] and susceptible to bus
snooping. Rewiring or snooping signals on a PCB requires
far less equipment than doing the same on an IC. Moreover, a
fraudulent firmware could, in theory, still leak secrets via a
physical channel [79]. Technical challenges of ARM Trust-
Zone have been reported recently [84, 92].
Usability: In this case, the user is not involved. However, if
users are aware of these measures, they can accordingly base
their trust decisions on them.
5.2.4 Software (Automatic)
For all assessed hardware wallets, the authenticity of the boot
loader and/or firmware is checked by a hash or signature
verification. This is carried out either by the firmware, the boot
loader, or the secure element. The simplest form of software
attestation provided by our tested devices is local firmware
validation. Thereby, the boot loader validates the integrity
of the firmware (by conducting a signature check), or vice
versa. For two of the assessed devices, the secure element
locally attests the authenticity of the micro-controller unit via
a signature check. A more sophisticated approach is to use
remote firmware attestation where the internal status of the
device is attested by a trusted third party (e.g., by utilizing
challenge-response protocols).
Yubico is very secretive about any of their implemented au-
tomatic software attestation methods. Thus, it remains unclear
whether such methods are applied to our tested YubiKeys.
Effectiveness: Remote firmware attestation is more effec-
tive than local methods since it complicates token replica-
tion. With remote attestation in place, attackers would have
to mimic the third-party attestation protocol. Generally, the
effectiveness of all firmware attestation methods is increased
if secure CPUs or secure elements are involved. Despite these
approaches being implemented, several attacks on firmware
have been carried out. Although manufacturers usually fix
these vulnerabilities, their existence—even if only for a short
time—poses a threat which is hard to defeat. As the man-
ufacturing of hardware tokens becomes more sophisticated
and globally distributed, and the time-to-market constantly
shortens, the probability of software vulnerabilities is grow-
ing [8]. Furthermore, automatic software attestation methods
are ineffective against hardware implants, IC modification,
USB exploits, token pre-initialization, and secret extraction.
Usability: Automatic software checks do not require user
interaction, hence they do not cause any usability issues. How-
ever, if these checks are not visible and/or known to users,
they are not able to make related trust decisions.
5.2.5 Software (Manual)
YubiKeys come with a pre-loaded attestation key and a
manufacturer-signed attestation certificate. Users can man-
ually verify the authenticity of their YubiKey by visiting a
sub-page of the manufacturer’s website [115]. With regard to
our sample, Yubico and Ledger do check the attestation key
of the devices. A server (e.g., an online banking service) can
optionally request an attestation certificate from a YubiKey
during user registration to check the device’s authenticity.
YubiKeys additionally have the option to run Personal Iden-
tity Verification (PIV) attestation for newly generated keys
to ensure that a certain asymmetric key was generated on the
device and not imported from elsewhere.
A further attack prevention method (used by two of the
tested hardware wallets) is to ship tokens without firmware,
thus forcing users to manually load the firmware when ini-
tializing their wallet. Thereby, any pre-loaded keys or seeds
are erased.
Effectiveness: Key attestation does prevent token replicas,
if implemented with a secure CPU or secure element from
which an attestation key and certificate cannot be extracted.
This raises the bar for firmware modification, since attack-
ers cannot simply flash fraudulent firmware. Forcing manual
firmware loading complicates token replicas and prevents
firmware modifications, given that the user overwrites fraudu-
lent firmware with the legitimate one. This also complicates
secret extraction attacks because an extracted secret would
loose its value as soon as the new firmware is installed.
Usability: Manual authenticity checks are often not user-
friendly. In many cases, users have to run a script via the
terminal (i.e., YubiKey PIV attestation, YubiKey attestation
certificates, hardware wallets’ secure element authenticity
check). Also, manufacturers neither sufficiently explain nor
advertise these methods.
6 Survey
Our user survey was designed to address RQ2. In particular,
we sought to answer the following questions:
• Which automatic authenticity checks are users aware of?
• Which manual authenticity checks do users perform?
• Are these authenticity checks perceived as useful?
• Do users’ perceptions of security guarantees match the
technical reality?
Participants who owned (i) a hardware wallet, and/or (ii)
a YubiKey, and/or (iii) a smartphone were eligible to par-
ticipate. They were presented with questions regarding the
respective device. We recruited smartphone users as a control
group to compare usage and authenticity check patterns of de-
vices designed for security purposes only (hardware wallets,
YubiKeys) with general purpose devices (smartphones). We
did not include attack vectors and attestation features which
solely apply to smartphones in our market review. However,
all presented attack vectors (see Section 4.1) also apply to
smartphones.
6.1 Discussion Rounds
Following Jensen and Laurie [47], we conducted a small-scale
qualitative research study to flexibly explore the problem
space before designing our survey. Two researchers did two
discussion rounds with (i) a group of people working in the
field of IT security who owned an HST such as a hardware
wallet or a YubiKey (9 participants), and (ii) a group of people
without technological expertise who owned a smartphone (3
participants). Both groups were recruited at our institution.
We asked the following questions: (i) Which HSTs or devices
do you own? (ii) Do you think that your hardware device was
genuine when you received it? (iii) Why do you think that
your hardware device was (not) genuine? (iv) Which attacks
on your device can you imagine could have happened while
it was distributed?
One researcher led the discussion while the other one took
notes. We recorded and transcribed both discussion rounds
after obtaining informed consent. Both researchers openly
coded the data independently, extracting re-occurring themes
and then discussing them to collect important findings for our
survey design. We took the results of both discussion rounds
and our market review into account when designing the main
questionnaire.
6.1.1 Results (Smartphone Group)
All participants stated that they did not spend much thought
on the authenticity of their device when they received it, but
just assumed that it was genuine. The two most important
factors influencing the participants’ trust were (i) the high-
quality design of the packaging, and (ii) the integrity of the
stickers on the package or device. One participant stated:
“The packaging is very high quality. I’m not sure that someone
who forges it [the smartphone] would put so much effort into
the packaging.”
This participant further elaborated that the quality of the
smartphone met expectations, i.e., the display and the buttons
functioned properly. Another participant mentioned that a
protection foil on the screen influenced their trust.
The participants’ assessments of the likelihood of distri-
bution attacks were mixed. One participant said: “From the
moment it [the smartphone] is in the supply chain, packaged,
and this foil is on it... When you open that up, to get it all back
in the same way, that is very time-consuming.”
In contrast, another participant stated: “I can imagine that
one would build something like that into the hardware, for
example, spying stuff.”
6.1.2 Results (HST Group)
In contrast to the smartphone group, the majority of the HST
users said that they did not fully trust the genuineness of their
device when they received it. One participant explained that
one can never entirely trust the cryptography on the device if
one has not implemented it themself. Another participant said:
“If someone changes the hardware, there is no chance for the
normal user to detect it. Especially with the Yubikey, which is
cast in plastic...You can only hope you got an original key.”
Still, some participants reported that their trust in their HST
was positively influenced by stickers on the packaging and by
the fact that their device arrived at their home address shortly
after purchasing it. One participant furthermore stated: “I
trust the Yubikey because the advertising is good and because
other people I trust do trust this product.”
None of the participants opened their HST as they (i) were
afraid to break it, (ii) did not want to spend time on it, or
(iii) did not think that attacks based on added hardware could
work. Two participants said that they checked the authen-
ticity of their HST on the vendor’s website since that was
recommended in the manual. Another participant mentioned
that the potential damage caused by a non-genuine device,
i.e., how valuable the secrets protected by the token are, is
important when deciding which authenticity checks to use.
This might be a reason why the HST group invested more
time and thought into the authenticity of their devices than
the smartphone group.
6.2 Study Design
We opted for an online survey [56] to get a large number
of—also geographically distributed—participants and, thus,
quantitative insights about user perceptions and usability prob-
lems of authenticity checks deployed in HSTs. We designed
our survey based on the discussion rounds and a comprehen-
sive literature study of attack vectors. The survey consists
of 25–27 closed questions (multiple-choice, 5-point Likert
scale) and 2–3 open questions depending on the answers
(some questions were follow-up questions). To assess the
participants’ security affinity, we used the Security Behavior
Intentions Scale (SeBIS) [25] which quantifies intentions and
self-assessments of the respondents’ security behavior. We
hosted the questionnaire on Surveymonkey.com [103]. The
full questionnaire can be found on our GitHub repository [1].
If participants owned multiple eligible devices, we assigned
them either to the hardware wallet sample (first choice) or the
YubiKey sample (second choice), assuming that HST users
are harder to recruit than smartphone users.
6.3 Recruitment and Participants
We distributed our survey through Bitcoin, blockchain, and
Yubikey mailing lists (18%), social media (75%) and personal
contacts at partner institutions (7%). As compensation, we
raffled gift vouchers and premium fair trade chocolates (win-
ning chance: 6%). This approach is in line with studies by
Deutskens et al. [21] and Laguilles et al. [55] which both
showed that lotteries with smaller prizes but a higher win-
ning chance are an effective strategy for increasing response
rates in surveys. The demographics of our final data set are
shown in Appendix 7. The sample consists mainly of male
and technically adept participants, corresponding to the de-
mographics of Bitcoin users [9] and the technology industry
in general [89].
6.4 Validity and Reliability of our Dataset
To ensure sufficient statistical power, we calculated the effec-
tive sample size [61] with a significance level of .05 (95%
confidence interval), and a power of .8 (the best practice value
currently used [65]). These numbers yield a minimum sample
size of 61 users per group. Our final dataset consists of re-
sponses from 62 hardware wallet (H ), 66 YubiKey (Y ), and
66 smartphone users (S ). We asked the participants for de-
mographic data including their occupation and whether it is
within IT security. Two thirds of our participants work in IT,
from which 42% are professionally involved in IT security
topics and decision-making.
We pre-tested our survey design through a think-aloud
study with seven participants (non-/tech-savvy users) to check
the comprehension of technical terms (taken from the man-
ufacturers’ websites) and remove biased phrasing as far as
possible. Additionally, we collected expert feedback from
other researchers. Our main concern was to reduce social
desirability biases, especially with respect to more security-
aware participants. The survey was distributed in English and
German; two independent translators revised the translations.
To allow unaided answers, we provided "Others" options.
In order to eliminate re-submissions and automated submis-
sion, we performed technical measures and allowed only one
submission per email/IP address and device. We are confident
that none of our participants lied about the possession of a
hardware wallet, YubiKey, or smartphone to unfairly obtain a
price in our raffle, assuming that smartphones are common.
Participants who owned neither of the three devices were
immediately redirected to the SeBIS [25] questions. We im-
plemented three exclusion criteria to ensure a reliable set of
data and applied them in the following order:
• Four open and two check-up questions (re-phrasing ear-
lier questions or providing invalid answer possibilities),
which we manually checked for consistency and mean-
ingfulness (21 participants were removed).
• One attention check question with shuffled answer op-
tions (58 participants were removed).
• Completing of the questionnaire was mandatory (six
participants were removed).
In total, 279 participants took part in our survey. After
applying our exclusion criteria, we reached a final sample of
n = 194 for our analysis.
6.5 Data Analysis
Besides descriptive statistics, we also performed statistical
tests. For closed-ended nominal scaled questions, we con-
ducted pair-wise χ2 tests between our three groups and in-
terpreted the effect size Cramér’s V [49]. In cases where
the expected frequencies were smaller than 5, we addition-
ally conducted a Fishers’ Exact test. To counteract the multi-
ple comparisons problem for multiple answer questions, we
applied the Holm–Bonferroni correction [41]. For interval-
scaled questions, we calculated the Pearson correlation co-
efficient ρ. We rejected the null-hypothesis of independence
when p was smaller than .05 (95% confidence interval).
Regarding the open questions (qualitative data), two re-
searchers independently coded the responses concerning (i)
the improvement suggestions of authenticity checks, and (ii)
the “other” answer option to closed-ended questions. We cre-
ated a codebook, coded the entire data and discussed conflicts
until agreement was reached among the coders. Our inter-
rater reliability α = .91 (Krippendorff’s Alpha value [54])
indicates a high level of agreement.
6.6 Ethical Considerations
Our ethical review board approved the study. Preserving the
participants’ privacy and limiting the collection of sensitive
information as far as possible are fundamental principles. We
assigned the study participants IDs to anonymously process
their data. The collected email addresses from raffle partici-
pants were stored separately from the survey responses. All
participants were informed about the data handling proce-
dures and gave informed consent. The study strictly followed
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
6.7 Results
6.7.1 Device Usage (Q2, Q3, Q18)
We observed significant differences in the device usage across
all groups (χ2(Y H ,Y S ,H S) : p < .02) with high V for H S
(.6) and Y S (.42) and a medium V for Y H (.28). Only 45%
of H and 66% of Y , but 98% of S use their devices regularly.
We attribute this to the fact that smartphones are commonly
used for everyday tasks and HSTs for security-related tasks
only. Moreover, we explain the more frequent device usage of
Y as opposed to H by the fact that authentication tasks are
performed more often than cryptocurrency transactions.
Related to the usage context, we found significant differ-
ences with large V between H and the other two groups
(χ2(Y H ,H S): p < .01, V > .39 [large]). In contrast, no no-
table differences emerged between Y and S . The majority
of Y and S reported to use their devices in both their private
and professional life (Y :50%, S :47%), followed by exclu-
sively private (Y :39%, S :48%) or professional usage (Y :10%,
S :5%). In comparison, 85% of H stated to use their HST only
for private purposes with much lower percentages for private
and professional (11%) or only professional usage (3%).
6.7.2 Trust Factors (Q4/a, Q17)
The upper part of Table 3 shows whether our participants
trusted their devices’ genuineness when receiving it. Most of
H and S stated that they did, whereas Y were more sceptical
and often reported a lack of knowledge (χ2(Y H ): p < .03,
V > .19 [small]; χ2(Y S): p < .03, V > .22 [medium]). We
assume this difference might be due to recent media reports
on flawed or counterfeit YubiKeys [16, 97].
The lower part of Table 3 describes which factors influ-
enced the participants’ trust in the genuineness of their devices
when they received it. Generally, the majority of all groups
reported a high influence of the packaging characteristics on
their trust, except for holographic stickers which mostly did
not affect their perception of device genuineness. There were
significant differences in trust in the vendors name and logo
between H and S (χ2(H S) : p < .01, V = .29 [small]) and
noticeable although insignificant differences between Y and
S . Moreover, significant differences emerged in regards to
high-quality packaging between Y and S (χ2(Y S) : p < .01,
V = .3 [medium]). This shows that HST users are more scep-
tical about these packaging characteristics than S .
An undamaged product increased the trust of the majority
of all groups with no significant differences across them. In
contrast, less than half of the participants found it important
that their device was not put into operation with significant
differences between Y and H (χ2(Y H ) : p < .01, V = .25
[small]). The higher numbers for H can be explained with re-
ports on attacks utilizing pre-initialized hardware wallets [98].
The majority of participants trust the manufacturer. Although
not significant, the opinion of other people is more important
for HST users than for S .
6.7.3 Performed Authenticity Checks (Q5)
After receiving their devices, H performed the most and S
the least authenticity checks (see Figure 2). We attribute these
low S numbers to a lacking "authenticity check culture" in
the smartphone world, as smartphones are not solely designed
for security purposes. Most smartphone manufacturers do
not offer any form of authenticity checks. Furthermore, we
explain the fact that H are more willing to perform authentic-
ity checks than Y with potentially highly valuable monetary
assets stored on H tokens.
More H than S compared the outside of their devices with
reference pictures (χ2(H S) : p < .01,V = .33 [medium]).
Moreover, HST users performed checks on the manufactur-
ers websites more often than S (χ2(H S) : p < .01,V = .54





ne Yes 95% 82% 93%
No 0% 0% 3%










g not damaged/opened 74% 65% 77%
vendors name/logo displayed 45% 56% 75%
high quality 47% 33% 64%




t not damaged 65% 70% 79%
has not been put into operation 40% 12% 36%




d manufacturer 73% 61% 61%
other people’s opinion 63% 68% 50%
Groups: Hardware Wallet (H ), YubiKey (Y ), and Smartphone users (S ).
For the trust factors, multiple answers were possible.
[large], χ2(Y S) : p < .01,V = .42 [medium]). H conducted
the most software signature checks with significant differ-
ences to S (χ2(H S) : p < .01,V = .36 [medium]).
A significant higher percentage of Y than H reported to not
have performed any authenticity check at all (χ2(H Y ) : p <
.01,V = .30 [medium]). Since YubiKeys cannot be opened,
Y did not inspect their device’s interior (check-up question:
χ2(H Y ) : p < .01,V = .28 [small], χ2(H S) : p < .01,V =
.28 [small]). We did not specifically ask H about their hard-
ware wallet model, but about the manufacturer and the year
of purchase. Based on this information we estimate that more
than 50% of H ’s hardware wallets can be opened. However,
less than half of those performed this check. Two participants
explicitly stated they were afraid to damage the case.
6.7.4 Manual and Automatic Checks (Q8, 10, 15, 16)
About half of HST owners (Y :41%, H :51%) and 3% of
S reported that they performed manual checks, which is in
line with their answers to Q5 (see Section 6.7.3). We asked
our participants whether authenticity check instructions were
provided by the manufacturers and found significant differ-
ences in their answers (χ2(Y H ,Y S ,H S): p < .01, V > .35
[large]). 72% of H , but only 30% of Y and 6% of S stated
that instructions were provided. From those participants who

















Figure 2: Performed Authenticity Checks (Self-Reported)































H 31% 23% 26% 19% 39% 3%
Y 39% 9% 26% 17% 45% 6%
S 36% 17% 24% 17% 24% 20%
Interior inspection
H 34% 5% 19% 34% 24% 32%
Y 14% 3% 12% 9% 29% 43%
S 27% 5% 24% 27% 18% 26%
Automatic checks
H 49% 74% 38% 22% 2% 0%
Y 54% 89% 11% 0% 0% 0%
S 31% 17% 9% 17% 6% 5%
Manual checks
H 32% 56% 41% 22% 2% 0%
Y 33% 48% 33% 30% 3% 0%
S – – – – – –
Signature or
hash check
H 24% 82% 17% 13% 2% 8%
Y 21% 75% 15% 12% 3% 5%
S 27% 65% 17% 11% 6% 17%
Single-piece cast
H 8% 5% 29% 31% 32% 23%
Y 9% 6% 41% 41% 33% 11%
S – – – – – –
Hardware wallet (H ), YubiKey (Y ), and Smartphone users (S ).
– Manual checks and single piece casts are mostly not applicable for S
answered to Q15 with "yes" (prerequisite for answering Q16),
the majority (H :80%, Y :70%) thinks that they have carried
out all provided checks. Thereby, we observed no significant
differences between Y and H (χ2(Y H ) : p > .08,V = .35
[large]). The answers of S to Q15 can be neglected, since only
four participants of S answered that their manufacturer pro-
vided information on manual authenticity checks and, hence,
reached this question.
Our results show significant differences between all groups
in their assessment of whether automatic authenticity checks
are performed by their devices (χ2(Y H ,Y S ,H S) : p <
.02,V > 0.24 [medium]). 76% of H were confident that au-
tomatic checks are implemented in contrast to 14% of Y and
21% of S . Some stated that they do not know whether any
checks were carried out (H :13%, Y :29%, S :45%), which
indicates a lack of information material as the automatism
might conceal this method’s existence.
6.7.5 Perceived Security (Q6, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q12, Q13)
We asked our participants about their perceived effectiveness
of authenticity checks in relation to attack vectors (Table 4).
Holographic Stickers: Their ineffectiveness, as found in
the market review, was perceived as such by about two-fifths
of HST users. Half of them mistakenly stated that these stick-
ers prevent token replication or hardware/software modifi-
cations. In contrast, S mainly reported prevention against
swapping devices, and only a fourth of them attributed no ef-
fectiveness to the stickers. A higher percentage of S than HST
users reported a lack of knowledge with significant differences
between S and H (χ2(H S) : p < .01,V = .25 [small]).
Interior Inspection: The majority of Y reported a lack of
knowledge on its effects, which we attribute to the single-
piece cast of YubiKeys that prevent interior inspection. This
led to significant differences between Y and H for added
hardware (χ2(Y H ) : p < .04,V = .30 [medium]) and notice-
able although not significant differences for swapped devices.
In fact, both attacks are made more difficult through interior
inspection. A large fraction of H reported a lack of knowl-
edge or ineffectiveness of the method, which suggests missing
information material. Two H participants reported that they
refrained from opening their token out of fear to damage it.
Automatic Checks: Large fractions of H and Y indicated
that automatic checks prevent software modification, which is
correct (see Table 1). About one-third of S and about half of
Y and H thought that automatic checks prevent token repli-
cation. This is partly true if remote firmware attestation is
implemented, which can complicate token replication. More-
over, many H and some Y stated that automatic checks would
prevent hardware modifications or added hardware, which is
incorrect. These results show that the benefits of automatic
checks are not clearly communicated to (HST) users.
Manual Checks: Y and H stated that manual checks
mainly prevent software modification, followed by hard-
ware manipulation, token replication, and additional hardware.
For S , not enough participants reported having performed
these checks in order to draw statistically significant conclu-
sions. Depending on the manual checks offered, these can
indeed prevent software modification (manual firmware load,
firmware attestation) or token replication (key attestation).
However, manual authenticity checks cannot protect against
added hardware or IC modifications. From these results, we
derive that HST users do not have a clear idea of the security
benefits offered by manual checks. This is also emphasized
by the results of Q16a where HST users stated that they did
not know which authenticity checks existed and were not sure
whether these methods are suitable to ensure genuineness.
Although manual and automatic checks can offer equal pro-
tection, our participants trusted the automatic checks more.
This indicates that especially the benefits of manual checks
are not sufficiently conveyed to them.
Signature or Hash Check: The majority of all groups cor-
rectly reported that this check prevents software modifica-
tion, with no significant differences across groups. Neverthe-
less, many participants (additionally) incorrectly stated that it
would protect against swapped devices, hardware implants or
modification. Participants of all groups assessed the benefits
of automatic/manual software checks differently in compari-
son to signature/hash verification—although they are actually
similar—and assumed a connection between software checks
and hardware authenticity.
Single-Piece Cast: Although some participants correctly
stated that single-piece casts can prevent (or complicate) hard-
ware implants/modification (see Table 1), a third reported that
Table 5: Perceived vs. Actual Effectiveness of Attestation
Actual effectiveness (market review)
# no prevention  strong protection









































































































. Tamper-evident G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G#





e Single-piece cast  G# G# # # # # G# G# #
Openable device G# G# # # # # # # # #
Secure element (co-processor) #   # # #  G#   





e Local firmware attestation # # #  # # # # # #
Remote firmware attestation # G# #  # # # # # #
Key attestation #  # G# # # # # # #
Manual firmware load # G# #  # G# G# G# G# G#
1 Benefits need to be better explained to customers.
they do not have any benefit. Generally, Y rated the benefits
higher than H with significant differences for adding hard-
ware χ2(Y H ) : p < .01,V = .42 [medium]). We assume this
is the case because hardware wallets are not cast in one piece.
However, our findings show that also Y underestimate the
security benefits offered by single-piece casts.
6.7.6 Perceived Likelihood of Attacks (Q14)
In order to determine whether our participants feel the need
for authenticity checks, we asked how they perceive the like-
lihood of different attacks (see Appendix 3). All groups con-
sider the presented attack vectors as unlikely. For the ex-
traction of valuable information, we observed slightly higher
percentages of "very likely" answers, which we attribute to
frequent media reports on such attacks [24, 74].
6.7.7 Security Awareness (Q23)
Based on nine questions from the Security Behavior Inten-
tions Scale (SeBIS) by Egelman and Peer [25], we conclude
that our sample is more security-conscious (score: µ > 4.1,
σ = 1.1) than their sample. The SeBIS answers of Y and H
correlate strongly with each other (ρH Y > .97, p < .02) and
less with S (ρH S ≈ .91, ρY S ≈ .9, p < .04) as our S group is
slightly less security-savy.
We found no statistical significance for a correlation be-
tween the participants SeBIS score and correct or incorrect
assessments of the authenticity checks. This might be due to
the fact that our participants’ SeBIS answers are very homo-
geneous, and most of them are in the upper third of the SeBIS.
6.8 Limitations
Our recruitment methods allowed us to collect a represen-
tative sample from the IT industry and Bitcoin community
(see Section 6.3), which is skewed towards male and tech-
savvy participants. Due to the lack of available data regarding
the overall population of hardware wallet and YubiKey users
we cannot conclude whether our sample is representative of
these two groups with respect to demographics. Moreover, no
expressive evaluation of cultural differences can be made as
our sample is biased towards residents of industrial countries.
As the survey was conducted either in English (87%) or Ger-
man (13%), people speaking other native languages and/or
having no or weak English or German skills were potentially
excluded. Furthermore, if longer periods of time have passed
between HST purchase and taking part in the study, this may
have influenced how accurately the participants recalled the
authenticity checks.
7 Discussion
In this section we connect the results from the survey and
the market review and provide seven actionable recommen-
dations for a secure and user-friendly design of HST au-
thenticity checks (answering RQ3). Table 5 compares the
effectiveness of attestation methods as assessed in the mar-
ket review with user perceptions. Darker shades of red indi-
cate methods that users perceive as effective, while lighter
shades indicate perceived ineffectiveness. These colors visu-
alize trends based on the HST users’ responses to whether the
described method prevents certain attacks (Q4a, Q6, Q7, Q9,
Q11–Q13). The effectiveness of some methods is correctly
perceived, while that of others is severely over-estimated ,
severely under-estimated , or slightly over-estimated (see
the following subsections). Our survey showed that these gaps
between perceived and actual security of HST authenticity
checks are caused by a lack of information and transparency.
Our market review also revealed that many manufacturers
do not implement sufficient and/or transparent authenticity
checks. We found that no single check and no currently imple-
mented combination of checks can adequately protect against
the multitude of attack vectors described in this paper. In order
to maximize the security and usability of HST attestation, we
suggest (i) a user-centered transparent design combined
with (ii) secure CPUs or elements, (iii) remote firmware
attestation, and (iv) collaborative protocols [19].
7.1 User-centered Design
To close the gap between the perceived and actual security of
authenticity checks, we propose to visualize the availability
and results of authenticity checks (incl. information material)
and provide standardized labels.
7.1.1 Transparent authenticity checks
In line with Distler et al. [22], Fahl et al. [29], Mathiasen
et al. [69], and Mai et al. [67], we argue that security mech-
anisms should not be completely hidden from users since
transparency of these mechanisms is crucial for perceived and
actual security. In order to understand security characteristics
and build up trust, authenticity checks should be visible to
users by adapting the UI of HSTs. Rode et al. [90] showed that
visualizations of system aspects can help people understand a
system’s security and incorporate it into their actions. They
suggest not to overwhelm users with complexity but dynami-
cally visualize system aspects as a GUI’s temporal response.
For HSTs, this could be achieved by spinners, check-marks,
or warnings that explain the process and results of authenticity
checks. The effectiveness of security warnings was demon-
strated by Akhawe et al. [4] who also recommended that
security information should be communicated to users.
Our market review found a lack of accessible information
on implemented authenticity checks, which was confirmed
by our survey. Our survey also indicates that users can be
effectively reached via online or offline information.
Recommendation 1: The existence and results of authentic-
ity checks should be visualized to users (e.g., through spinners,
check-marks, or warnings) following the respective design
literature [100, 102, 112]. Easily accessible descriptions of
authenticity checks should be provided online and offline.
7.1.2 Security Labels
To avoid overwhelming users with complex information, se-
curity labels similar to the European Union energy label [15],
with equivalent grades from A (most secure) to G (least se-
cure), should be introduced. Clear guidelines for manufactur-
ers on how to achieve a specific grade should be provided.
Such labels could encourage manufacturers to implement
high-quality and secure authenticity checks by giving them
a competitive advantage. Our evaluation framework (attack
vectors) and recommendations provide a basis for construct-
ing such labels and to certify the implementation of secure
HST design rules.
Available independent certifications, such as NIST FIPS
140-2 [77], were explicitly designed for cryptographic mod-
ules in governmental use. They are not easily understandable
for end users and do not cover attestation mechanisms. To ob-
tain such a certificate, third-party laboratories have to conduct
costly tests. Such certificates should be taken into account
when creating user-friendly HST security labels.
Recommendation 2: Self-explanatory security labels
should be placed on the HSTs to facilitate purchase decisions.
7.2 Secure CPU or Secure Elements
Protecting the key material in trustworthy hardware is
paramount for HSTs. The effectiveness of many software
methods (including local/remote software attestation and key
attestation) is dramatically increased when implemented on a
side-channel-hardened circuitry (see Section 5.2.3). Neverthe-
less, only six out of the nine tested devices use secure CPUs or
secure elements. We think this is due to additional costs and
effort during design and production. In general, secure CPUs
and secure elements do not require user interaction. However,
in our survey we found that their effectiveness is incorrectly
assessed by the majority of the users as their existence and
benefits are not transparent. Hence, secure elements/CPUs
cannot affect users’ trust.
Recommendation 3: HSTs should deploy a secure element
or secure CPU that contains critical operations and data
and checks the firmware in a secure boot setup. Authenticity
checks should be visible, and security labels should verify
their existence (see Section 7.1).
7.3 Remote Firmware Attestation
Remote attestation (currently only implemented in two of the
tested devices) is more effective than local methods. Our sur-
vey showed that the effectiveness of local and remote firmware
attestation is assessed correctly (see Table 5). However, we
also found that many users are not aware of these methods.
Hence, they do not increase the users’ trust in their devices.
Recommendation 4: Methods for remote firmware attesta-
tion should be implemented. These methods should be made
visible to users (see Section 7.1).
7.4 Collaborative Protocols
In-protocol secret leakage and weak or pre-loaded keys on
HSTs can be prevented with collaborative protocols. To date,
no off-the-shelf HST implements this approach. Thereby,
the single point of computation at the HST is removed and
distributed equally between the HST and the browser. The key
and signatures are generated during their interaction; thereby,
the browser can enforce the HST’s correct behavior without
learning the secret. If one of the parties produces attacker-
impacted results, the other one will detect that.
Dauterman et al. [19] recently showed that collaborative
key and signature generation is feasible for U2F tokens. It
is not straightforward to apply such protocols to hardware
wallets, as confirmed by one manufacturer. Hardware wallets
commonly use BIP32 (a standard for hierarchical determin-
istic wallets) [58, 111] which does not support collaborative
and verifiable key generation building on verifiable identity
families (VIFs). Upgrading hardware wallets to use such pro-
tocols would force users to distinguish between BIP32 and
upgraded wallets, given that the key schemes are different.
Collaborative protocols have no immediate usability issues
since the execution is hidden from the users. However, secrets
can still be leaked out-of-band or via the USB interface, and
ransom attacks are still feasible.
Recommendation 5: U2F tokens should implement collab-
orative protocols for key and signature generation. Other
token families should consider a long-term switch. Self-
explanatory labels and sufficient information material (see
Section 7.1) should be used to inform users about implemented
methods and achieved security benefits.
7.5 Manual vs. Automated Checks
Our survey shows that many HST users are not aware of
the performed automatic checks or underestimate their ef-
fectiveness (key attestation) due to a lack of visibility and
information. Our market review and survey revealed that man-
ual authenticity checks are often too complicated or time-
consuming for users and, moreover, are not sufficiently adver-
tised by manufacturers (e.g., command line checks). Hence,
they are only performed by half of H and less than half of Y .
We found that many users are eager to compare the packaging
or the product with reference pictures, but felt let down by
manufacturers who only provided insufficient material.
Recommendation 6: HSTs should implement automated
but transparent authenticity checks (see Section 7.1). If man-
ual methods are used, they should be a mandatory part of the
initialization process. Moreover, all methods should be easily
visible and explained on the manufacturers’ websites.
7.6 Openable Devices vs. Single-Piece Casts
Token manufacturers use two mutually exclusive approaches:
(i) easily openable HSTs for visual inspection of the interior,
or (ii) unopenable HSTs with integrated electronics or a single-
piece cast. Both approaches are double-edged swords:
Our market review shows that easily openable devices pro-
vide quick access to users and attackers alike. However, our
survey also revealed that users rarely open and visually in-
spect their HST. A possible remedy would be an application
that automatically compares pictures of the devices’ inside to
reference pictures. Still, verifying the genuineness of such an
application would pose a new and complex challenge.
On the other hand, users can easily inspect the state of
single-piece cast devices, which provides some level of se-
curity assertion. The inside cannot be seen; therefore, an
attacker needs to create a similar-looking outer appearance
of the product (see Section 5.2.2). Our survey showed that
users incorrectly rate the security benefits of single-piece cast
devices rather low. Manufacturers could experiment with see-
through molded devices; the Ledger Nano S series already
offers transparent cases. However, it is also openable, thus
diminishing the security intent of the transparent case.
Recommendation 7: If manual inspection of the hardware
is required, it should be tightly integrated in the initialization
process. If single-piece casts are used, their security proper-
ties should be clearly communicated to the user (Section 7.1).
7.7 Security Theater
Security theater [96] describes actions aiming at creating a
sense of security although they are not (or only marginally)
effective. In our market review, we could verify that although
holographic stickers are frequently used, they are ineffective
against all attack vectors presented in this work. Our sur-
vey confirms that, depending on the target audience, many
customers understood the insignificance of holographic stick-
ers, while others assumed that they offer a level of protec-
tion. Along these lines, e.g., Ledger claims not to use anti-
tampering seals (or holographic seals) since they give users a
false sense of security [57].
We also found that it is common practice to utilize tamper-
evident packaging, although this is less effective than other
approaches. Our survey suggests that packaging profoundly
influences the users’ trust. We recognize that this method
might be useful to increase people’s trust in their HST. How-
ever, we argue that such an approach on its own is unreward-
ing in the long-term.
Recommendation 8: Authenticity checks that give users a
false feeling of security while only being marginally (or not)
effective should be disestablished.
8 Conclusion
Our findings show that technical and usability issues of au-
thenticity checks in widely used HSTs undermine the security
benefits these tokens are supposed to provide. We performed
a market review of state-of-the-art HSTs and a large-scale
survey to assess users’ perceptions and usage of authenticity
checks. Our results suggest that commonly used authenticity
checks—even the best-case implementations—are not suffi-
cient to defeat distribution attacks. Moreover, users cannot
make informed trust decisions based on the deployed methods
as their existence and benefits are often hidden. Thus, users
currently base their trust decisions to a large extent on visual
but noneffective features such as packaging.
Based on our findings, we suggest a multi-faceted approach
maximizing security through automation and user engage-
ment. We propose more transparency for users, secure el-
ements/CPUs, and collaborative protocols for practical im-
provement.
As future work, further usability studies will be required
to determine these suggestions’ actual effectiveness and ef-
ficiency. For instance, lab studies could be conducted in
which counterfeit/modified HSTs, with and without our rec-
ommended improvements, are provided to users in order to
assess how well they can detect attacks, and how much of a
difference can be achieved through our suggestions. We fur-
thermore aim at developing a standardized procedure, includ-
ing security labels which help users to judge HST genuineness
based on the implemented authenticity checks. We will use
participatory design studies to investigate how security guar-
antees can be visualized and made transparent to users. We
also plan to examine novel attestation methods (e.g., trans-
parent molded enclosures) via user experiments. Researchers
should also study how collaborative protocols and currently
not implemented hardware tampering prevention approaches
(e.g., sensors, hardware metering) can be applied to HSTs.
We propose to include prospective users in the design
process of HSTs to determine a threshold for user engage-
ment and obfuscation. Our work strongly suggests that the re-
search community, together with token manufacturers, needs
to assess and develop secure yet comprehensible authenticity
checks for HSTs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Features of other U2F Vendors






























































. Tamper-evident  H#1 H#1 H#1 # # # H#1






Single-piece cast         
Openable device –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2
Secure CPU  # # # # # # #






Local FW attestation ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Remote FW attestation # # # # ? ? ? ?
Key attestation    # ? ? ? ?
Manual firmware load # # # # # # # #
1 Vendors changed their packaging multiple times in recent years.
2 Single-piece casts and openable devices are mutually exclusive.
A.2 Demographics
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A.3 Perceived Likelihood of Attack Vectors
Figure 3: How likely participants perceive attack vectors
